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Discretionary powerWorldwide, there is growing reliance in forest politics on public–private partnerships (PPPs) as ameans for forest-
environmental protection. In Sweden, such partnership characterizes the approach in nature conservation
agreements (NCAs) in the forest policy from 1993 and onwards. NCAs are negotiated between the County
Administrative Board/the Forest Agency and a landowner, where the landowner agrees to, with some compen-
sation, provide a public service in terms of protecting biodiversity. However, assessments of the implementation
of NCAs show rather inefﬁcient implementation of set goals in general, even if there are great regional variations.
This paper explores factors affecting the establishment of PPPs in twoneighboring counties distinguished by high
and low level of goal achievement of NCAs respectively. The analysis focuses on the process among the land-
owners and responsible authorities, their incentives for collaboration, and the potential for developing shared
motives. The results suggest that in particular the discretionary power of authorities inﬂuences not only the
willingness to participate, but also the institutional ability to develop sustainable relationships which largely
explains why landowners in some counties are keener to engage in NCAs.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The international Nagoya agreement states that at least 17% of land
and freshwater areas, along with at least 10% of coastal and marine
areas, should be protected by 2020. Despite a rapid increase in
the number of protected areas in Sweden, only approximately 6% of
the 22.5 million ha of productive forest land is protected (SFA, 2013a,
b). One reason for the difﬁculties in achieving international and national
commitments is that, as elsewhere (Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Wiersum
et al., 2005), much of the forest is privately owned. In Sweden, 50% of
productive forest land is owned by individuals, 25% by private compa-
nies and only 17% by the state (SFA, 2013a,b). The government is thus
dependent on approximately 320 000 landowners and 5200 privately
owned forest companies (SFA, 2013a,b) to protect forest land when
delivering these commitments.
Forest conservation in Sweden is delivered largely top-down by
responsible authorities where the government either acquires the land
or restricts the owners' access (Nature Conservation Agreement report,
2010). This approach has often led to poor results, creating conﬂicts
and lack of trust between the authorities and landowners (Sandström
et al., 2010). To overcome these problems, top-down policy instruments
have been complemented with voluntary instruments such as public–
private partnerships (PPPs). In Sweden, nature conservation agreements
(NCAs)were introduced in 1993 as a partnership between governmental
authorities and landowners in order to achieve overarching biodiversity
objectives. In NCAs, which are used worldwide, for example, in Australia@hotmail.se.
. This is an open access article underand the Netherlands (Moon and Cocklin, 2011; Bennett and Ligthart,
2001) the landowner agrees to deliver biodiversity protection in return
for economic compensation.
Partnerships for sustainable development were promoted at the
Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.
However, the efﬁcacy of these partnerships has been contested. While
some see PPPs as an innovative form of governance (Glasbergen,
2011) others argue that the partnerships lack accountability and
legitimacy (Meadowcraft, 2007) and are possible undemocratic.
In practice, NCAs have proven a rather inefﬁcient tool to attain envi-
ronmental objectives (Swedish Government Bill, 2008/09:214), although
there are differences between counties (Fig. 1). Goal achievement is
measured in relative terms: the proportion of implemented NCAs per
county between 1993 and 2011 in relation to the objectives of each
county deﬁned by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency.
Most studies of NCAs focus on the outcome in terms of protected
forest while few consider aspects related to the process of establishing
and implementing partnerships (Critchley et al., 2004; Mäntymaa
et al., 2009; Sierra and Russman, 2006). The aim of this study is to rem-
edy this and determine what factors affect the process of establishing
PPPs and how these are perceived among the actors.
The analysis, inspired by Glasbergen (2011) focuses on particular on
the interactive process between the landowners and responsible
authorities, asking; i) What political, legal and ecological factors affect
the conditions to implement NCAs? ii)Which attitudes andmotivations
promote shared understanding? iii) What process elements promote
partnering? and iv) What factors promote the constitution of a joint
rule system in a partnership?the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Fig. 1. Goal achievement of NCA (%) per county (SFA, 2011).
221U. Widman / Forest Policy and Economics 50 (2015) 220–227The studied counties, Örebro and Västra Götaland, are neighbors in
southern Sweden and appear at the top and bottom respectively of the
ranking list both in relative terms and absolute numbers with respect to
the implementation of NCAs (see Fig. 1). They share similar natural
characteristics but provide a contrasting picture as to the achievement
of partnerships, perhaps revealing the reason for this variation.
2. Background: Swedish nature conservation policy
Historically, Swedish nature conservation policy has been character-
ized by a top-down approach (Zachrisson, 2009a). In Sweden, as in
many countries, a shift occurred during the 1990s, from regulative
control to control with government objectives (Beland Lindahl, 2008).
Thus, the political and legal preconditions for nature conservation
changed, offering opportunities for interactive processes such as
partnering. As part of this change, NCAs were assumed to have a prom-
inent role in reaching the interim target set in Long-term protection of
forest land (Swedish Government Bill, 2008/09:214).
In Sweden, national parks and nature reserves are generally large
areas (Table 1), while woodland habitats and NCAs are considered rela-
tively small areas. The main difference between the different types of
protection is that NCAs are not permanent but a civil law partnership
lasting at a maximum of 50 years (Swedish Government Bill, 1992/
93:226). All these types of protection form the basis of the formal
protection in Sweden (SEPA and SFA, 2005).
The current form of NCAs was established in 2010, and has been
developed following the government's A sustainable nature conservation
policy (2008/09:214). Since 2010, the compensation levels have
increased. However, compensation for NCAs is taxable, being taxed in
the year the agreement is signed (Nature Conservation Agreement
report, 2010).
3. Theoretical framework
In this paper, public–private partnerships are deﬁned as “the pro-
cesses and structures of public policy decisionmaking andmanagement
that engage people constructively across the boundaries of publicTable 1
Types of formal protection of forest land in Sweden.
Criteria National park Nature reserve
Year of establishment 1909 1967
Ownership State State/municipalities
Size Large Large
Protection Permanent Permanent
Restrictions Ownership and hunting rights
restricted
Ownership and hunting rights
restricted
Compensation Reduction in market value with
a supplement of 25% or the
government buys the land
Reduction in market-value wi
a supplement of 25% or the
government buys the landagencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic
spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise
be accomplished” (Emerson et al., 2011, 2). The theoretical framework
used to analyze the partnering process is inspired by Glasbergen
(2011), stating that the development of partnering is a successive pro-
cess, which through different stages, brings together actors from several
sectors of society and builds new relationships to develop sustainable
management practices.
We assume that both societal and individual factors affect the
partnering processwhere a) the context i.e. the political, legal, socioeco-
nomic resources and ecological factors set the framework for the
partnering process, b) shared motivation but also mutual understand-
ing between the actors contribute to the establishment of trust, and
c) the process itself may create collaborative advantages that may lead
to d) the constitution of a common rule system (institutional arrange-
ments, leadership and resources).
3.1. The context
Several contextual factors, such as ecological factors characterizing
the forests, the national policy for formal protection of forest together
with the strategies of the responsible authorities, may affect the
establishment of PPPs.
Most of the protected areas in Sweden are located in the north
where mountain forests dominate (Angelstam et al., 2011). Southern
Sweden, where our case study areas are, contains the majority of the
small-scale landowners; the properties are smaller with greater biolog-
ical diversity than those in the north (Ingemarsson et al., 2006). Thus,
there is a need to extend the conservation network to the southern
part of the country (Angelstam et al., 2011), through voluntary instru-
ments where landowners can engage in the required management
(Nature Conservation Agreement report, 2010).
The urgent need for the Swedish government to protect biodiversity
to fulﬁll international commitments has inﬂuenced policies and the
legal framework, and opened up the establishment of interdependent
relationships between the authorities and landowners (Swedish
Government Bill, 2008/09:214). In line with Glasbergen (2012), the
new policies and legal frameworks contain enabling support, including
democratic norms, economic compensation and a policy framework
giving the partnerships a logical place in biodiversity policy. However,
authoritative methods of steering in the past, which have created
conﬂicts (Zachrisson, 2009a), may continue to have a negative impact
on the relationships between the actors. Previous research in Finland
has shown that the level of economic compensation is a source of
conﬂict in these types of partnerships since the landowners want ade-
quate compensation, while the government wants to minimize costs
(Mäntymaa et al., 2009).
The individual strategies of the authorities to protect forests are also
relevant, particularly in Sweden with its independent authorities with
discretionary powers (Cinque, 2011) to deﬁne regional objectives and
guidelines. Discretionary power is deﬁned as “the notion of choice and
power within a structure of rules” (Cinque, 2011, 604). Despite the pro-
motion of national and synchronized policy guidelines regarding NCAsWoodland habitat Nature conservation agreements (NCA)
1993 1993
State Private
Small (approx. 20 ha) Small
Permanent Up until 50 years
Ownership and hunting rights
not restricted
Ownership and hunting rights not restricted
th Reduction in market-value with
a supplement of 25% or the
government buys the land
For a contract on 50 years, compensation
payment is maximized to 60% of the market
value of the land set aside.
222 U. Widman / Forest Policy and Economics 50 (2015) 220–227(Nature Conservation Agreement report, 2010), the variation in strate-
gies and guidelines in each county needs may cause variations in their
implementation.
3.2. Building trust
Glasbergen's ladder consists of several levels representingdifferent ac-
tivities. The ﬁrst level is “exploratory” and considers the mechanism of
building trust as a basis for interaction between the partners (2011).
The mechanisms include both the attitudinal basis for the establishment
of a PPP, in this case in terms of forest ownership motivation, but also
forest protection (Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Bergseng and Vatn, 2009) and
the extent to which the partners have a mutual understanding of the
objectives of the PPP and the exchange of services (Glasbergen, 2011;
Emerson et al., 2011).
The attitude to forest protection among landowners is often as-
sumed to vary due to, for example, the level of economic compensation
(Bergseng and Vatn, 2009), size of forest holding (Juutinen et al., 2005)
and membership of a forest owner's association (Rickenbach et al.,
2008).
Disputes over compensation levels are often given as the main
reason for conﬂicts (Bergseng and Vatn, 2009). Landowners who work
in non-forestry-related jobs, and are not economically dependent on
their forests for domestic or commercial use, tend to focus their man-
agement on esthetic and/or recreational goals instead of productivity
(Wiersum et al., 2005). How compensation is perceived among the
landowners must be considered before implementation, as it concerns
maintenance of relationships (Vatn, 2010). For instance, including
payments in a situation where the acquisition of land is not primarily
seen as an economic issue may disrupt existing relationships (Vatn,
2010, 1248) indicating that it is the perception of a payment that may
affect motivation (Vatn, 2010). Another incentive to participate could
relate to the size of the holding. Juutinen et al. (2005) showed that
participants in partnership-based tend to have relatively large forest
estates, presumably because the total size affects the area they cannot
use.
Attitudes to biodiversity protection within forest owners' associa-
tions can inﬂuence participation in voluntary based protection (Berlin
et al., 2006). This was revealed in the U.S. where members of forest
owners' associations placed greater importance on ecological beneﬁts
than non-members and were more active in their forest management
(Rickenbach et al., 2008).
Shared motivation between the partners is thus considered to be an
important basis on which to build trust. Indeed, attitudes may vary as
long as every actor understands and respects other actors' perceptions
of the objectives of the partnership (Emerson et al., 2011).When actors
respect each other, they usually feel that their opinions are represented.
Previous research has shown that partnership processes often fail be-
cause landowners feel uninvolved (Bergseng and Vatn, 2009). Shared
motivation and mutual understanding may provide the partnership
with the necessary stability to enable trust, learning and exchange of
knowledge (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Emerson et al., 2011). Howev-
er, the participants may agree on a shared set of goals despite different
attitudes to forest protection.
3.2.1. Creating collaborative advantages
The second level refers to the formation of the partnership as a new
agreement. The central mechanism is ‘exploring collaborative advan-
tage’ (Glasbergen, 2011). However, “attitudinal readiness and trust are
not enough” (Glasbergen, 2011, 5), the actors also need to ﬁnd a
common ground for action i.e. the collaborative advantagesmust relate
to resources, skills and relationships. For each actor, theremust be a per-
ceived balance of beneﬁts and costs (Glasbergen, 2011). Collaborative
advantages develop in the interactive process through what Emerson
et al. (2011) deﬁned as basic process elements: discovery, deﬁnition,
deliberation and determination.Discovery is already developed in the ﬁrst stage of the Ladder since it
implies identifying shared interests, analyzing relevant information,
and recognizing the consequences of setting aside land for protective
purposes. Later in the process, discovery includes joint fact-ﬁnding
(Emerson et al., 2011). The deﬁnition process yields informed choices
and clariﬁes which tasks are to be undertaken by whom. The actors
deﬁne common purposes and agree on the NCA, its implication and
amend the tasks and expectations of one another (Emerson et al.,
2011). Deliberation may be the most essential ingredient of successful
engagement (Emerson et al., 2011). This should result in more active
participants with wider knowledge (Zachrisson, 2009b). Deliberation
is not only communication within a partnering process, but also one
form of participation that is both deliberative and democratic. One
particularly important precondition for deliberation is equality, which
implies that all have the same opportunity to raise issues and propose
solutions; thus every actor should have access to all communications
(Zachrisson, 2009b). Deliberation implies participation on equal terms.
Finally, in the determining processes, the substantive content of
collaborative initiatives is created through procedural decisions and
agreements. It has been argued that engagement results in efﬁcient
determinations (Innes and Booher, 1999), but there is only limited
research on their quality. However, research indicates that a well-
functioning determinations process tends to yield enhanced trust and
better integration of knowledge into deliberations (Emerson et al.,
2011).
Thus, a partnering formation must be grounded in the collaborative
advantages found among the actors, such as increased economic
compensation for landowners and improved biodiversity protection
for authorities.
3.2.2. The constitution of a common rule system
Glasbergen's third level (2011), constituting a rule system, focuses on
the formalization of partnerships. To reach the stage of formalization,
the capacity of joint action must be identiﬁed (Emerson et al., 2011).
The intermediate variables leading to such capacity depend on the de-
velopment of institutional arrangements, resources (forest personnel
and subsidies) and leadership (key individuals from the responsible
authorities/forest owners' associations).
Glasbergen (2011) argued that a ‘social contract’ deﬁnes the
common rule system in which the partners formally invest in each
other. The contract speciﬁes the commitment and rules, and comprises
both internal aspects, in which the mutual obligations of partners are
deﬁned, and external ones related to how the partnership will interact
with other organizations.
The formalization should list transactional and procedural elements
of the arrangement, such as commitments to different tasks and re-
sources, how the partnership will deal with decision-making processes
and monitoring (Glasbergen, 2011). Wunder (2007) argued that PPPs
tend to lack explicit frameworks with which to monitor their own
success. This is problematic, since provisions in the contract and the
degree to which the actors live up to them, largely deﬁne the continuity
of trust and collaborative advantages (Glasbergen, 2011).
Fig. 2 summarizes the different stages that affect a partnering
process and related research questions.
4. Method and material
4.1. Research design
The cases were selected by comparing the rate of implementation of
NCAs in all counties in Sweden.
Based on a novel case study design (Merriam, 1994), we selected the
counties with the highest and lowest degree of NCAs. The two counties,
Örebro and Västra Götaland, are similar in other important aspects. For
instance, they are both situated within the boreonemoral forest zone
(Personal contact, Riksskogstaxeringen, 2013), in which temperate
¤ Policies
¤ Strategies
¤ Ecological factors
Question:
What political, legal, and 
ecological factors affect 
the conditions for
implementing NCAs? 
¤ Attitudes to 
protection
¤ Motives for forest 
ownership
¤Economic
compensation
¤ Respect & mutual 
understanding
Question: 
What attitudes and 
motivations promote 
shared understanding?
¤ Discovery
¤ Definition
¤ Deliberation
¤ Determination
Question:
What process
elements
promote partnering?
¤ Institutional 
arrangements
¤ Resources
¤ Leadership 
Question:
What factors 
promote the 
constitution
of a joint rule
system?
Context
Building 
trust
Collaborative 
advantages
Constituting a 
rule system
Fig. 2. The establishment of an ideal partnering process.
223U. Widman / Forest Policy and Economics 50 (2015) 220–227deciduous forest and boreal forest interconnect (Fulton and Prentice,
1997), thus creating favorable physical conditions for biodiversity pro-
tection and promoting broadleaved species (Angelstam et al., 2011).
The forest in both counties is dominated by Norway spruce and pine,
but the number of broadleaved trees is increasing slowly (Örebro
regional strategy, 2006; Västra Götaland regional strategy, 2006).Fig. 3. Location of the counties studied.The forest industry plays a crucial role in economic and regional
development in both counties (Örebro rural programme, 2012; Västra
Götaland's rural programme, 2012), but economic factors are also a
crucial role at an individual level.
Västra Götaland is a much larger county with 1 334 000 ha of pro-
ductive forest land (Västra Götaland rural programme, 2012) compared
to Örebro with only 560 000 ha (Fig. 3) (Örebro Forest Agency, 2013).
In Västra Götaland, some 80% of the forest is privately owned by
47 000 landowners (Västra Götaland Forest Agency, 2012) while in
Örebro, less than 50% of the forest is owned by approximately 9000 in-
dividuals (Örebro Forest Agency, 2013). The rest in both counties is
owned by forest companies. The forest owners' associations mainly or-
ganize landowners: Södra Skogsägarna in Västra Götaland with 11 576
members (Södra Skogsägarna, 2013) and Mellanskog in Örebro with
1043 members (Mellanskog, 2013).4.2. Methods
Our empirical material combined document studies, primarily the
government bill A sustainable nature conservation policy (2008/09:214)
and policy documents for NCAs (Nature Conservation Agreement
report, 2010, 2013), with face-to-face and telephone-based semi-
structured interviews conducted in early spring 2013. In total, 27
in-depth interviews were carried out with 18 landowners (14 men
and 4 women) and ﬁve ofﬁcers of the Forest Agency and the CAB in
the two counties. A snowballing technique (Kvale, 1996) was used to
reach saturation in the interviews.
The majority of interviewed owners (excluding ﬁve) had inherited
their forest property and most forest was locally owned. The random
sample of owners that had implemented an NCA was derived from
the Forest Agency in each county, but this sample could still be catego-
rized by considering the theoretical themes (Kvale, 1996). The original
intention was also to interview those who had declined to enter an
NCA, but it proved difﬁcult to ﬁnd them since they were not registered
with the Forest Agency or CABs. Only one landowner in each county
who declined the offer of implementation was interviewed. Another
issue was that the landowners were selected by the agencies, thus
increasing the risk of bias; however, the respondents represent a wide
range of opinions.
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working for forest owners' associations, and another two with forest
managers from forest owners' associations in both counties.
The interview themes were based on the analytical framework and,
during the analysis, certainwordswere allocated to speciﬁc themes. The
interviews lasted for approximately one hour and were recorded and
later transcribed; the respondents were given the opportunity to revise
the transcription.5. Results
The results are divided into subsections based on the theoretical
framework: context, building trust, creating collaborative advantages
and the constitution of a rule system.5.1. Context
Examining what political, legal, and ecological factors affect the
conditions for implementing NCAs in our case studies, we found that
both Västra Götaland and Örebro adopted Regional Strategies for formal
protection of forests. The strategies depart from the national policy for
formal protection (SEPA and SFA, 2005) and describe, in detail, the
state-of-the-art of forest protection and the strategies in each county
for reaching the goals for the different forest protection types (see
Fig. 2). Since both counties have to relate to the same national policy,
this cannot fully explain the differences in implementation of NCAs.
However, when comparing the two regional strategies, it becomes ap-
parent that they emphasize the role of collaboration differently. They
contain different interpretations of how the national policy for formal
protection should be achieved.
While Västra Götaland emphasizes the role of the landowner (Västra
Götaland regional strategy, 2006), Örebro only brieﬂy mentions the
need for a common view on objectives and working methods (Örebro
regional strategy, 2006). This might be a consequence of the different
landowner structures in the two counties, where we might assume
that Västra Götaland is more dependent on a good relationship with
its many landowners. Moreover, the socioeconomic factors seemed, in
our study, not to explain a major variation in goal achievement. These
factors were not mentioned in the strategies or by the respondents.
The same subsidies are distributed to both counties, implying that
these factors should be of minor importance.
Based on the interviews, the discretionary power of authorities
seems to be an important factor in explaining the variation. However,
discretionary power is not a formal strategy, rather it is an informal
power that indirectly affects implementation. Interviews with ofﬁcers
suggest that Örebro has chosen to put more emphasis on the establish-
ment of nature reserves, since reserves are considered as “long-term
solutions, which require less paperwork” (Interview 21) compared to
NCAs. The authorities in Örebro concluded that nature reserves are
more effective, since they offered larger areas with higher nature
value. This use of their discretionary power has an economic component
too. Ofﬁcers at the Örebro CAB have found that landowners prefer the
nature reserve option since they receive greater compensation. This
has resulted in a reduction in ﬁnancial resources for protected areas,
because a nature reserve is more expensive than an NCA. Therefore,
Örebro CAB has been advised by the SEPA to work more actively in
implementing NCAs. This is not the case in Västra Götaland, where the
Forest Agency has extensive experience of implementing NCAs.
The strategies, together with the interviews, suggest that Västra
Götaland is more experienced in motivating landowners to implement
NCAs. It appears as if the chosen strategies, to some extent, could
explain why Västra Götaland achieves more goals than Örebro because
of its emphasis on collaboration with landowners, but also the use of
discretionary powers to promote NCA implementation.5.2. Building trust
We assumed that to build trust, a shared understanding is needed
where the participants agree on a shared set of goals, despite different
attitudes towards forest protection.
As earlier research has shown, many landowners who entered an
NCAwere not employed in forestry, tending to focus their management
on esthetic and/or recreational use instead of wood production
(Wiersum et al., 2005; Mäntymaa et al., 2009). In our study, these
owners were often positive towards protecting the environment, but
tended not to be in favor of nature reserves because of loss of owner-
ship. NCAs were thus considered more positive: “Nature conservation
agreements I also ﬁnd as a good form (of protection) … you feel that
you still own the land, although you don't have much to say about it,
but you can pursue a dialogue with the Forest Agency if there is some-
thing that needs to be done…” (Interview 5).
Earlier research suggests that members of forest owners' associa-
tions tend to be more environmentally motivated than non-members
(Rickenbach et al., 2008), but it was not possible to detect such a pattern
in our study. Some of the respondents who were members were rather
unenthusiastic about forest protection and more dissatisﬁed with the
NCA process compared to non-members. Other respondents who
were forest owners' association members, who were more positive
about NCAs, claimed they had not been inﬂuenced by their member-
ship. Differences in perceptions between our respondents seem to be
linked to county i.e. the respondents in Västra Götaland were more
positive towards NCAs than those in Örebro.
Some of the landowners, in particular in Örebro, were worried that
the agencies would set aside toomuch forest thus reducing their ability
to make a living from it. Economic issues, together with a feeling of loss
of land that took away their freedom to manage the forest as they
wanted, were highlighted as the primary reasons why authorities and
landowners did not reach an agreement.
Themainmotive among thosewhohad entered agreementswas the
desire to protect the area from threats such as clear-cutting by new
owners. The landowners not only stated environmental motives, but
emphasized their emotional attachment to a heritage they manage.
Regardless of whether the landowners were economically dependent
on their forest, most of them emphasized the taxation issue. Several
considered the compensation to be too low and argued that a revision
of taxation would render the compensation satisfactory.
The landowners felt that they were not understood by the au-
thorities with respect to the low compensation and taxation.
Some owners, who were negative about NCAs, expressed feelings
of loss as they did not know that they still had ownership “… I
found it sad, because our farm has been inherited over more
than 200 years …” (Interview 15). In addition to this perceived
loss, among these owners, the compensation and taxation problem
contributed to a feeling of resignation “… as a landowner I have no
power to speak of …it is something that they draw on a map when
they perceive they found something valuable, but they would ﬁnd
it anywhere if they want …” (Interview 18).
The interviewed public ofﬁcers from both authorities generally con-
sidered the compensation for NCAs as fair, on the grounds that it is not a
permanent form of protection; none of them seemed to be aware of the
taxation issue.
Shared motivation is also dependent on the partnering process itself.
Based on earlier contacts, some of the respondents had negative experi-
ences of being contacted by CABs and the Forest Agency, which inﬂu-
enced their ﬁrst meeting about NCAs. This, however, changed in Västra
Götaland, where the contacts established with the Forest Agency were
often perceived to be positive. Many of these respondents even
pinpointed one speciﬁc person who was considered “a practical man, he
is not only theoretical” (Interview 1). The respondents trusted him and
felt that their concerns were taken seriously. Some of the respondents
in Örebro did not have the same experience and expressed distrust “…
225U. Widman / Forest Policy and Economics 50 (2015) 220–227one cannot stand against it… because they take it (the forest) anyway”
(Interview 15).
Contrary to previous research, our results suggest that different mo-
tives among landowners do not have a major inﬂuence on willingness
to participate. We identiﬁed several perspectives among landowners
who were willing to implement agreements. The term ‘active’ charac-
terized almost all landowners, since most of the respondents, both res-
idents and non-residents, perceive themselves as active owners, despite
their different experiences of forest management. The active and
commercially-focused owners often represent landowners with large
properties. They may not be considered as environmental-friendly, but
when given the opportunity to set aside forest not intended for felling,
they might feel they have less to lose. Owners with small properties
may have greater relative losses of income, despite not deriving their
main earnings from their forest. However, quality and type of forest
land seemed to matter more for those who entered an agreement.
Active and heritage-focused landowners appeared as themost common
type, given that almost all owners emphasized that theymanaged a her-
itage. The majority did not make a living from their forest and could
often, but not always, afford to set aside land.
5.3. Creating collaborative advantages
In this section, two representative narratives of a successful and a
failed process of establishing an NCA are presented, analyzed and
compared, based on the basic process elements— discovery, deﬁnition,
deliberation and determination (Emerson et al., 2011). The ﬁrst narra-
tive concerns an agreement to protect 4.5 ha in Västra Götaland in
2011. On their estate (58 ha), the owners combined ecological farming
with small-scale forest management. The second agreement concerns
3.8 ha in Örebro County in 2011. This estate (58 ha) is characterized
by small-scale forest management.
One major difference between the two cases is on whose discovery
the agreement was established. In the ﬁrst case, it was the landowners
who turned to the Forest Agency applying for protection after an upset-
ting experience regarding selective harvesting. “The entrepreneur who
carried out work did a very, very bad job. So bad that my husband and
I became so upset that we halted all other harvesting in our forests
and decided that this will never happen again…” (Interview 1). In the
failed case, it was the Forest Agency who, after a felling notiﬁcation,
advised the owner to turn the forest, deﬁned as a key habitat, into an
NCA. The owner felt that this was disadvantageous since he would
have preferred to fell this forest area.
Another difference concerns the deﬁnition process. In the ﬁrst case,
the couple was well-informed about NCAs as they had actively
researched the information themselves. They could, together with the
representative from the Forest Agency, deﬁne common purposes,
agree on the NCA and have expectations of one another. In the second
case, the landowner did not know about this particular form of protec-
tion and thus the deﬁnition of common goals did not always appear to
be explicit “… they forced it on us, if you spoke up and wanted to
negotiate the price, then they just stopped.”
In the ﬁrst case, deliberationwas emphasized, particularly because of
a skillful forest ofﬁcer “…we experienced that this (NCA) was a much
betterway to go, to sit down and talk…whatwewantedwith our forest
and how the Forest Agency viewed this and why they were interested”.
In the process, the couple did not contact their forest owners' associa-
tion because they trusted their contact from the Forest Agency and felt
he listened to their perspectives. Together, they reached a compromise
that later resulted in an agreement. In contrast, in the failed agreement,
deliberation did not characterize the process since “… they (the Forest
Agency) decided and then I got maybe something I could decide over,
but that was about it”. The landowner used a legal representative
from his forest owners' association who tried to negotiate the compen-
sation, which he found helpful. However, he did not feel that the
participation was on equal terms; rather, he felt forced into it.The couple in the ﬁrst case could determine the content of the NCA
together with the forest ofﬁcer. The management tasks to be carried
out were viewed as something that increased their interest in the
area. This interest was demonstrated by something that happened in
summer 2012, regarding an old spruce that had fallen onto a small
path, obstructing tourists. The couple called the Forest Agency for advice
and “… I received the message that you do as you like. You can cut it
down, he said, and take it away. Because he knew that we would not
go in there with anymachines…” The couple rounded off the interview
by stating that they viewed their contact with the Forest Agency as “… a
regular collaboration…” In the second case, the ownerwas not involved
in determining the content of the agreement. This lack of involvement
in the ﬁnal agreementmade him frustrated, because he felt this affected
the compensation level and its taxation.
5.4. The constitution of a rule system
Initially, we assumed that the partnership would deﬁne the common
rule system, specifying the commitment and common motivation to
improve efﬁciency. Our interviews, however, show mixed results
concerning what factors promote partnerships. In well-functioning
cases, owners are generally convinced that they would enter into a new
NCA if the opportunity arose. As in the positive case described above,
they were pleased with the process and often highlighted a speciﬁc ofﬁ-
cer, which indicates that leadership plays an important role as a facilitator
in the process. They tended to have more knowledge of what an NCA
implied, based on their interest of forest protection. However, even the
positive owners mentioned the problem and lack of information about
taxation. One owner who had been positive in entering into an NCA
from the start, stated that he might not have done so now, now that he
knew about the unfavorable conditions regarding taxation. According to
the Forest Agency's and CAB's procedures, landownerswho have taxation
questions are told that compensation for NCA is viewed as an economic
activity, and if they have other questions they should turn to their ﬁnan-
cial advisors. These procedures are not only related to regionalwork strat-
egies, but grounded in decision-making on a national level.
The joint action also included monitoring of the agreement. In the
Forest Agency's procedures, it is stated that the NCAs should be moni-
tored every four years, where management tasks are discussed with
the owner. Lack of time and insufﬁcient personnelmade themonitoring
of agreements rare. Hence, the agreements, whichdeﬁnemutual obliga-
tions, are not properlymonitoredwhich in turn could affect biodiversity
protection.
6. Discussion
This study's objective was to explore factors affecting the establish-
ment of PPPs and how they are perceived among the involved actors.
The results indicate how a partnering process is established in practice.
The ﬁrst research question concerned context and, in this case, the
differences between Örebro and Västra Götaland seem to be caused by
the discretionary power of Swedish authorities, although on the nation-
al level, legal or socioeconomic factors also affect the implementation
rate. Cinque's study (2011) of discretionary power gave insights as to
why the chosen case study areas have differing implementation results.
The two counties have chosen to establish different proﬁles of forest
protection, where Västra Götaland emphasizes collaboration and the
need for transparency while Örebro only brieﬂy mentions collaboration
in its strategy. Örebro has also chosen to distribute more resources to
other forms of protection, since they view nature reserves to be more
sustainable. In contrast, Västra Götaland, and particularly its Forest
Agency, more actively promotes the implementation of NCAs.
The second research question referred to the types ofmotivations and
attitudes that would promote shared understanding.When looking at in-
dividual landowner's motives to enter into NCAs, we identiﬁed, in accor-
dancewith existing literature (Bergseng andVatn, 2009;Mäntymaa et al.,
226 U. Widman / Forest Policy and Economics 50 (2015) 220–2272009), several attitudes among those landowners willing to implement.
Most of the respondents, both residents and non-residents, perceived
themselves as ‘active’ owners, despite different experience in forest man-
agement. In contrast to earlier studies (Berlin et al., 2006; Rickenbach
et al., 2008), we found no support for the claim that members in forest
owners' associations would be more environmentally-motivated than
non-members. Different perspectives of forest protection were found in
both counties. However, in our sample, the landowners living in Västra
Götaland were generally more positive about NCAs than those in Örebro.
The results suggest that landowners with large properties and/or
who have environmental and heritage-focused motives are more likely
to enter into an agreement. The landowners' emphasis on the value of
protecting their heritage is an interesting ﬁnding, since this indicates
that environmental interest is not always required for landowners to
be motivated.
Landowners' differing attitudes indicate that motivation does not
automatically lead to shared understanding. Rather, our results indicate
how landowners are treated by responsible authorities affects whether
shared understanding is achieved. However, since we used a limited
sample, a quantitative study would better explain these ﬁndings.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the different strategies in the two counties
inﬂuenced the relationship between the authorities and landowners.
This leads into the third research question concerning Emerson et al's.
(2011) process elements and how these promote partnering. Västra
Götaland County has a more developed strategy on how to create shared
understanding. As shown in the positive case, the actors jointly found in-
terest in the area. In contrast, where a common interest was not found,
this often badly affected the agreement. The owner and the Forest Agency
or CAB needed to deﬁne a common purpose for the main goal of
protection. If the purpose of an agreement was not clear to everyone,
the initiation process stopped early on. The process depended on how
well individual and represented interests were considered, for instance,
through listening to landowners' concerns over taxation rules. Lastly,
the actors needed to agree on the agreement's content. If the landowners
perceived that they had discussed the content of the agreement together
with the responsible authority, they were, generally, satisﬁed.
Many of the respondents in Västra Götaland County also identiﬁed
one speciﬁc ofﬁcer who they felt was trustworthy. Hence, a shared set
of goals among the actors was developed, underpinning trust.
The last research question concerned the factors promoting the
creation of a joint rule system. The results suggest that NCAs' rule
system depends on individual leadership, which Emerson et al. (2011)
deﬁned as an important driver. The role of individual leadership was
shown in the form of skillful forest ofﬁcers who actively promoted
NCAs and supported owners. This study also supports the necessity for
compensation (Mäntymaa et al., 2009; Vatn, 2010). However, many
landowners found the “taxation problem” to be more important than
the low compensation. It appears that the responsible authorities do
not consider taxation as a problem, because it is ‘outside’ their institu-
tional setting. This relates to the fact that the government has not
considered mainstreaming different institutional arrangements.
In accordance with Wunder's (2007) ﬁndings, the authorities and
landowners agreed that therewas a problemwith themonitoring caused
by a lack of resources, particularly in Örebro. Glasbergen (2011)
suggested that lack of resources could threaten trust, which the results
from the respondents in this study seem to show, since several land-
owners mentioned they were confused over how little help they were
given managing the site. More resources could help forest personnel,
together with landowners, to identify realistic social and ecological goals
(Wunder, 2007).
7. Conclusions
Each county's strategy for forest protection seems to affect the im-
plementation rate of NCAs more than anything, even general legal and
socioeconomic factors. Despite their similarities, the chosen strategiesindicate that Västra Götaland focuses more on collaboration than
Örebro. The discretionary power of authorities in Sweden thus seems
to be an important factor explaining variation in goal achievement.
The individual perspectives of landowners may, to some extent, also
explain implementation. Landowners' motivation to enter into an
agreement does not automatically lead to mutual understanding be-
tween landowners and authorities. We identiﬁed several perspectives
among the landowners, indicating that they may have multiple
incentives to enter into NCAs. This is not a problem as long as the end
objective i.e. forest protection, is the same.
The study suggests that process-related factors are important to
understand how and why landowners can trust and perceive an agree-
ment as well-functioning. Whether trust and collaborative advantage
(Glasbergen, 2011) will continue to characterize an agreement seems
to be dependent on the level of resources distributed to the responsible
authorities.
This study shows that the discretionary power of authorities inﬂu-
ences the willingness to participate and how landowners perceive
NCAs. Accordingly, the results indicate that the implementation of
PPPs may, sometimes, leave landowners with the perception that the
responsible authorities did not include them in the process. Therefore,
to understand the potential of using PPPs as a tool to attain environmen-
tal objectives, we cannot only focus on the outcomes, but must also
consider the process-related factors and the continuity of them.Acknowledgments
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